Most organizations do not lack talent programs. They have succession planning, performance management, leadership development, workforce planning, recruiting, career development, employee listening, learning, and increasingly sophisticated technology supporting each of them. Many of these practices may be well designed. Participation can be strong, processes can run on schedule, leaders can view polished dashboards, and individual programs can produce the outcomes they were created to produce. From almost any program-level perspective, the organization may appear to have a mature approach to talent.
Yet when an executive asks a more consequential question, the picture can change quickly: Is all of this actually increasing the organization’s ability to execute its strategy?
The difficulty is that talent practices are usually designed, governed, and evaluated according to their individual purposes. Succession planning identifies successors and assesses readiness. Leadership development builds targeted capabilities. Performance management establishes expectations and evaluates contribution. Workforce planning examines future workforce requirements. Recruiting brings talent into the organization. Career and mobility practices help people move and develop. Employee listening provides evidence about workforce experience and organizational conditions. Each practice has a legitimate purpose. The larger issue is whether those practices operate as an integrated set of decisions rather than as isolated activities. But having the components of a system is not the same as having a system.
Consider what can happen inside an organization with sophisticated talent practices. A workforce-planning process identifies a capability the strategy will require three years from now. The finding appears in a workforce plan, but it never materially changes leadership development, recruiting priorities, internal mobility, or succession criteria. A succession review identifies that several potential successors lack a critical type of experience, yet development planning continues through the same catalog of programs rather than creating the experiences necessary to close that readiness gap. Performance discussions produce evidence about strengths and capability limitations, but that information remains largely inside the performance process instead of informing mobility or succession decisions. Employee listening identifies a recurring organizational barrier to performance, while development investments continue to focus primarily on improving individual capability.
Nothing in those examples necessarily indicates that the individual programs are poorly designed. The problem exists between them. This distinction matters because organizations do not experience talent management as a collection of HR processes. They experience its combined effects through whether critical roles can be filled, whether leaders are ready when needed, whether capability keeps pace with strategy, whether people can move to where their contribution is most valuable, and whether workforce risks are recognized early enough to influence decisions. Those outcomes rarely belong to a single talent practice. They emerge from decisions and actions that cross several of them.
An organization can therefore improve every individual talent program without necessarily improving the talent system. Better succession software can make succession planning more efficient without creating more ready successors. More sophisticated learning can expand development opportunities without ensuring that the capabilities being built correspond to strategic demand. Better recruiting can improve candidate quality without resolving internal capability gaps. Stronger performance management can improve the quality of performance conversations without ensuring that what the organization learns about its people changes broader talent decisions.
This creates what might be called the program paradox: the organization becomes increasingly sophisticated at operating its talent practices while remaining uncertain whether those practices collectively produce the capabilities the business requires.
The answer is not simply to integrate everything. That response can create its own form of complexity. Connecting every process, dataset, governance forum, and technology platform to every other one may create more activity without producing better decisions. The stronger standard is not whether every practice is integrated, but whether the combination of practices produces strategic alignment, coherent decisions, and better organizational outcomes. The more important question is whether the right connections exist at the moments when one talent decision should meaningfully influence another. That is the point at which a collection of programs begins to behave like a system.
A system should be able to recognize what the organization will require, translate those requirements into implications for talent and capability, use evidence from across the organization to inform decisions, coordinate the mechanisms needed to act, and learn from what happens afterward. The individual programs still matter, but their value is no longer determined only by how effectively each performs its own function. Their value also depends on whether the information, decisions, and actions they produce can travel far enough through the organization to change something that matters.
That creates a different standard for talent management. Instead of asking whether the organization has best-in-class programs, leaders must ask whether those programs collectively create system behavior. Because the strategic advantage does not come from having more talent programs. It comes from whether the organization can make them work together to build what the business will need.
The architecture is therefore less about connecting every program than about preserving a chain of consequence. Strategic requirements should change talent assumptions. Talent evidence should change decisions. Decisions should activate the appropriate mechanisms. Actions should create new evidence. That evidence should be capable of changing the next decision. When this chain works, talent management becomes an organizational capability. When it breaks, strong programs can coexist with weak enterprise outcomes.
This creates a useful boundary between integration and system behavior. Integration describes whether processes, data, governance, or technology are connected. System behavior describes whether those connections change a consequential decision. Two practices can be technically integrated and still operate independently if neither materially alters what the other does. Conversely, two practices can remain operationally distinct and still behave as part of the same system if evidence from one reliably changes a decision in the other when the relationship matters.
A talent system is not defined by the number of programs it contains or by whether those programs sit on the same technology platform. It exists when strategic requirements can travel through the organization as connected evidence, decisions, and action. The system must be able to sense what the business will require, interpret what those requirements mean for talent and capability, decide how gaps should be addressed, coordinate the mechanisms that can act, and learn from the evidence those actions produce.
Programs Optimize Their Own Outcomes
The challenge begins with how talent work is usually organized. Different practices are often owned by different teams, governed through different cycles, supported by different technologies, and measured through different definitions of success. Succession planning may be judged by coverage of critical roles and the quality of successor slates. Learning may be evaluated through participation, completion, and capability-building outcomes. Recruiting may focus on time-to-fill, quality of hire, candidate experience, and hiring-manager satisfaction. Performance management may be assessed through process completion, calibration quality, and the strength of manager conversations.
There is nothing inherently wrong with that specialization. In fact, specialization can improve expertise, consistency, and execution. The problem emerges when each practice becomes primarily accountable for optimizing its own process rather than contributing to a shared organizational outcome.
A succession team can improve the accuracy of readiness assessments without changing what development experiences leaders receive. A learning function can build exceptional programs without knowing whether participants are developing the capabilities the business will need most. A recruiting team can fill roles quickly and effectively even when the role itself reflects outdated assumptions about how work should be organized. Performance management can generate richer evidence about capability and contribution while that evidence remains disconnected from succession, mobility, or workforce planning. In each case, the practice is functioning. The system is not.
This is a common organizational pattern because programs tend to create their own operating logic. They develop calendars, governance routines, language, metrics, templates, and technology around the problem they were designed to solve. Over time, those mechanisms can become increasingly refined. What becomes less visible is whether the outputs are being used elsewhere in ways that materially affect decisions. The distinction between program output and system consequence is therefore critical.
A program output tells the organization what happened within the practice. A system consequence shows whether that output changed something beyond it. Identifying a readiness gap is a program output. Changing development assignments, succession risk, or leadership deployment because of that gap is a system consequence. Forecasting an emerging capability requirement is a program output. Altering hiring priorities, internal mobility, role design, or development investments because of it is a system consequence.
This is why maturity cannot be inferred simply from the sophistication of individual practices. An organization may have advanced tools, experienced practitioners, robust governance, and strong participation across every major talent process while still producing weak system consequences. The practices are present. The outputs are credible. The missing element is the connection that allows one piece of evidence to influence another decision.
When that connection is absent, talent management can become increasingly active without becoming more strategic. More assessments are conducted, more dashboards are produced, more development programs are launched, and more reviews are completed, but the organization remains uncertain whether those activities are changing the capabilities that matter most. The strategic question is therefore not whether each program is doing its job. It is whether each program is contributing to a larger chain of decisions that helps the organization build, deploy, and sustain the talent required to execute its strategy.
The Missing Connections Matter More Than the Components
If program optimization explains how fragmentation develops, the next question is what actually distinguishes a collection of strong talent practices from a functioning talent system. The answer is not the number of programs an organization has, the sophistication of its technology, or even whether those programs share a common talent philosophy. The difference becomes visible in what happens when one part of the organization learns something important.
Imagine that the business strategy requires a significant expansion into a market where success depends on a capability the organization has historically needed only in limited pockets. Workforce planning identifies the requirement and estimates where demand will increase. In a program-centered model, that insight may produce a workforce plan and eventually inform hiring forecasts. The workforce-planning process has done what it was designed to do. But the strategic value of the insight depends on what happens next.
If the capability will also be required of future leaders, succession criteria may need to change. If internal candidates lack relevant experience, leadership development may need to create opportunities to build it. If the capability exists elsewhere in the organization, mobility may become more important than external hiring. If performance expectations do not recognize the behaviors or outcomes associated with the capability, managers may continue reinforcing yesterday's priorities. If recruiting is not connected to the same requirement, new employees may be selected against specifications that restore existing capacity rather than expand future capability.
The original workforce-planning insight has not changed. What changes is its organizational consequence. This is where the architecture of a talent system becomes visible. Information generated in one part of the system must be capable of changing decisions somewhere else when the relationship between those decisions matters. A future capability requirement should not remain solely a workforce-planning output if it has implications for hiring, development, succession, mobility, or performance. A readiness gap identified during succession should not end as a rating if closing that gap requires a different developmental experience. Evidence from performance should not remain trapped in an annual process when it materially changes what the organization knows about capability, potential, or deployment.
The same logic must work in the opposite direction. A talent system cannot simply push strategic requirements downward through a sequence of programs. It also needs to learn from what those programs reveal. If recruiting repeatedly struggles to find a capability the workforce plan assumed could be bought externally, that is new evidence about the feasibility of the workforce strategy. If development investments fail to improve readiness for critical roles, that should change assumptions about how the capability can be built. If high-performing employees consistently leave a particular part of the organization, the answer may not be another retention initiative. The pattern may reveal something about leadership, work design, career opportunity, or organizational conditions that requires a different decision elsewhere in the system.
In other words, the connections need to carry more than data. They need to carry consequence. That distinction matters because organizations can technically integrate processes without creating meaningful system behavior. A technology platform may place performance, succession, learning, recruiting, and skills data in the same environment. A common competency framework may give several practices shared language. Governance meetings may bring leaders together across talent disciplines. Those connections can be useful, but none guarantees that evidence generated in one place will actually alter a decision in another.
The more meaningful test is whether the organization can trace a consequential requirement through the talent system and see decisions change because of it.
If strategy changes the capabilities the organization requires, where does that change appear? Does it alter workforce assumptions? Does it affect which roles become critical? Does it change what leaders are expected to demonstrate? Does it influence where development investment goes? Does it change what the organization builds internally, acquires externally, or deploys differently? And as those decisions are implemented, does new evidence return to challenge the assumptions that produced them?
This creates a different way to think about talent-system effectiveness. The organization is not simply operating a set of processes. It is creating a chain through which strategic requirements become talent decisions, talent decisions become organizational action, and organizational evidence informs the next decision. Break that chain at any important point and individual programs can continue operating while the system loses strategic coherence. That is why the spaces between talent programs deserve as much attention as the programs themselves. A weak component can certainly limit the system. But a missing connection can make two strong components behave as though the other does not exist.
The objective, however, cannot be to connect everything to everything. If system effectiveness depends on meaningful connections, leaders still need to determine which connections actually matter. That distinction is essential because integration itself can become another source of organizational complexity.
Integration Is Not the Goal
Once leaders recognize that the connections between talent practices matter, the instinctive response can be to integrate more of them. Systems are consolidated, data is standardized, governance is expanded, processes are synchronized, and technology is configured so information can move across talent domains. Some of that work may be necessary. But integration is not evidence that a talent system is effective. It is only useful when the connection improves the organization's ability to make or execute a consequential decision.
That distinction matters because integration carries a cost. Every new connection can introduce additional data requirements, process dependencies, governance expectations, technology configuration, and coordination between teams. Leaders and managers may be asked to provide information in one process because it could theoretically be useful in another. Talent teams can spend considerable time reconciling definitions, aligning calendars, building shared frameworks, and connecting platforms without being able to demonstrate which organizational decisions became better as a result. A system intended to create coherence can gradually produce more complexity instead.
The better standard is decision relevance. Two talent practices should be connected when what one knows or does can materially improve a decision made by the other. Succession and development provide a clear example. If succession planning identifies that a potential successor lacks experience leading through a particular type of business challenge, that evidence should matter to development because readiness cannot improve simply by recording the gap. The connection has a purpose: it changes what experience the individual receives so that the organization can generate new evidence about readiness. If development activity has no relationship to the gaps succession identifies, both programs can operate successfully while the organization remains no closer to producing a ready successor.
The same principle applies between workforce planning and recruiting. A future capability requirement should influence recruiting when external acquisition is part of how the organization intends to close the gap. But not every workforce-planning output needs to become a recruiting priority. Some capabilities may be better developed internally, accessed through partnerships, redistributed through organizational design, or addressed through changes in technology and work. Connecting workforce planning automatically to hiring could actually narrow the organization's choices by translating every capability requirement into a requisition.
That example exposes a deeper point. A talent system should connect decisions, not merely processes. The distinction prevents integration from becoming an end in itself. Performance management does not need to feed every piece of information into succession. Employee listening does not need to influence every development decision. Recruiting data does not need to appear in every workforce discussion. The relevant question is whether a particular piece of evidence changes the quality of a consequential decision. If it does not, moving the information through the system may create activity without creating value.
This also means that system effectiveness cannot be reduced to a single technology platform. Technology can make connections easier by creating shared data, common workflows, and greater visibility across talent practices. But a technically integrated environment can still support fragmented decision-making. If leaders do not know which information should influence which decisions, connecting the systems simply makes more information available. The organization may have achieved data integration without achieving decision integration.
Governance presents the same risk. Cross-functional talent councils, integrated planning cycles, and shared reviews can improve coherence when they exist to resolve decisions that cross traditional program boundaries. They become less valuable when integration is interpreted as requiring everyone to participate in everything. The objective is not maximum connectivity. It is enough connectivity to prevent consequential information from becoming trapped inside the process that generated it.
This is why the design of a talent system should begin with the decisions the organization needs to make, not with a map of every program it wants to connect. Leaders can work backward from those decisions to determine which evidence is required, where that evidence originates, which talent mechanisms can act on it, and where new information must return to update the original assumptions. Some connections will be essential. Others will be useful only in particular circumstances. Many will not be necessary at all.
The resulting system may actually be less integrated than an organization initially imagines, but more coherent where integration matters. Instead of attempting to create seamless connectivity across every talent practice, it creates deliberate pathways around the decisions that most influence organizational capability. That changes the ambition. The organization is no longer trying to build the most integrated talent architecture possible. It is trying to build a talent system capable of turning strategic requirements into coordinated decisions without creating unnecessary complexity in the process.
The final test, then, is not how connected the talent architecture appears. It is whether those connections enable the organization to sense what it needs, decide what to change, act through the appropriate talent mechanisms, and learn whether those actions actually strengthened capability.
From Talent Programs to a Talent System
If integration is not the objective, then the defining question becomes whether the organization can convert talent information into coordinated action against strategic requirements. That is what separates a set of practices from a functioning system. The programs remain important, but they are no longer treated as independent destinations. They become mechanisms through which the organization senses changing requirements, makes talent decisions, acts on those decisions, and learns from the results.
That shift begins with strategy, but not in the superficial sense of attaching a strategic label to existing programs. The organization needs enough clarity about what the business will require so that talent implications can be identified before they become urgent. Those requirements may involve leadership capacity, technical depth, critical experiences, new forms of collaboration, greater decision quality, different organizational capabilities, or workforce capacity in places where current supply is insufficient. The talent system does not own those business requirements. Its role is to translate them into decisions about people, roles, capability, development, deployment, and risk.
From there, the organization needs evidence about its current state. That evidence may come from workforce planning, performance data, succession reviews, talent assessments, employee listening, labor-market information, internal mobility patterns, hiring outcomes, or other sources. The value of the evidence depends less on where it originates than on whether it helps the organization understand the gap between what the strategy will require and what the workforce can currently provide.
The next step is where many organizations lose coherence. Evidence must change decisions. If a capability gap is identified, the organization needs to decide whether to build it internally, acquire it externally, redeploy existing talent, redesign work, create new experiences, change leadership expectations, or combine several approaches. The answer will rarely sit within one talent program. It may require coordinated action across several of them, with each practice contributing only where it can materially influence the outcome.
Action then produces new evidence. Development experiences may improve readiness, or they may reveal that the original assumptions about capability were incomplete. Recruiting may confirm that external supply is abundant, or expose that the required profile is unrealistic. Internal mobility may uncover talent that was previously invisible. Performance evidence may show that a new capability is emerging faster in one part of the organization than another. Employee listening may reveal organizational conditions that are preventing people from applying capabilities they already possess.
A functioning system uses that evidence to update its decisions rather than waiting for the next annual cycle to begin the process again. This creates a recurring logic: Strategic Requirement to Talent Implication to Evidence to Decision to Coordinated Action to New Evidence to Updated Decision.
The sequence is more important than any particular program that participates in it. In one situation, succession and development may be central. In another, workforce planning and recruiting may matter more. In another, the most important intervention may involve role design rather than a traditional talent program at all. A system does not require every component to activate for every problem. It requires the right components to respond to the right organizational need.
That is also why a talent system should be judged differently from a collection of programs. Leaders should still care about whether individual practices are well designed and executed, but those measures are insufficient. The larger questions are whether strategic requirements are being translated into meaningful talent implications, whether evidence is influencing the right decisions, whether action occurs across program boundaries when necessary, and whether the organization learns quickly enough to change course when assumptions prove wrong.
This changes the role of talent leadership as well. The work is no longer only to operate excellent programs. It is to create enough coherence across them that the organization can make better decisions about capability over time. That requires attention not just to process quality, but to interfaces, evidence flow, decision rights, governance, and the points where one practice should influence another.
The executive implication is significant. An organization does not need more talent infrastructure simply because the existing system feels fragmented. It may need fewer disconnected activities, clearer decision pathways, and stronger relationships between the practices that matter most. The goal is not to create an elaborate architecture. It is to create a system that helps the organization build and deploy the capabilities required to execute its strategy.
That is the point at which talent management moves beyond a portfolio of programs and becomes an organizational capability in its own right.
What Great Organizations Do Differently
Great organizations do not necessarily have more talent programs. In many cases, they have the same core practices as everyone else. The difference is in how those practices are used. Talent processes are not treated as separate annual exercises that each produce their own outputs, reports, ratings, or action plans. They are treated as parts of a larger decision architecture designed to help the organization understand what capability it needs, what evidence it has, what choices it must make, and what should change as a result.
That difference begins with where the conversation starts. Program-centered organizations often begin with the process itself: Who needs to complete succession planning? When does the performance cycle open? What leadership programs should be offered this year? How many people should participate in development? Great organizations begin closer to the organizational requirement. They ask what the strategy will demand, where capability or leadership risk may emerge, which workforce assumptions need to be tested, and which talent decisions will matter most. The programs then become mechanisms for addressing those questions rather than activities that must be completed because the calendar says it is time.
They also distinguish between generating information and using it. A succession review that identifies a readiness gap is not considered complete simply because the gap has been documented. Workforce planning has not created value merely because future demand has been forecast. Employee listening has not resolved an organizational condition because leaders received the results. Great organizations expect consequential evidence to go somewhere. They make explicit which decisions should change, who owns those decisions, and which other parts of the talent system need to respond.
That does not mean every insight triggers broad action. Great organizations are selective about where connections are necessary. They resist the temptation to create an elaborate web of integration simply because technology makes it possible. Instead, they concentrate coordination around decisions where one practice can materially improve another. Succession and development become tightly connected when readiness depends on specific experiences. Workforce planning and recruiting connect when external acquisition is part of the capability strategy. Performance evidence influences mobility when it materially changes what the organization knows about where talent can contribute. The connection exists because the decision requires it, not because every talent process is expected to exchange information with every other one.
Great organizations also recognize that talent actions are hypotheses about what will strengthen the organization, not guarantees. A development experience is expected to increase readiness. A hiring strategy is expected to close a capability gap. A mobility decision is expected to deploy talent more effectively. Because those choices rest on assumptions, leaders pay attention to what happens afterward. If readiness does not improve, the development approach is reconsidered. If the external market cannot supply the capability assumed in the workforce plan, the build-versus-buy decision changes. If high performers continue to leave despite targeted retention efforts, leaders examine whether the underlying problem sits somewhere else in the organization.
This creates an important learning discipline. Great organizations do not allow every talent cycle to reset the conversation as though the previous one never happened. New evidence modifies earlier assumptions. Decisions accumulate organizational learning. The system becomes more informed because it remembers not only what leaders decided, but what those decisions actually produced.
The result is not a perfectly integrated talent architecture. It is a more coherent one. Strategy changes the talent questions being asked. Evidence changes decisions. Decisions activate the appropriate mechanisms. Actions produce new evidence. And that evidence helps the organization decide what should happen next.
That is what great organizations do differently. They do not judge talent management primarily by how many strong programs they operate. They judge it by whether those programs collectively help the organization build, deploy, and adapt the capabilities required to perform.
1. Are our talent programs solving their own problems, or helping solve the organization’s problems?
A talent practice can be well run and still be strategically weak if success is defined mainly by the quality of the process itself. Leaders should look beyond participation rates, completion measures, calibration quality, hiring efficiency, or learning activity and ask what changed in the organization because the practice existed. Did succession planning increase readiness for roles that matter? Did workforce planning change where capability was built or acquired? Did development investment close a gap that affected execution? The point is not to dismiss program-level measures. It is to ensure that process excellence ultimately contributes to a business-relevant consequence.
2. When one talent process learns something important, where does that information go next?
This question exposes whether the organization has real system connections or only adjacent programs. If succession identifies a readiness gap, does development change? If workforce planning identifies a future capability requirement, does recruiting, mobility, or role design respond? If performance evidence changes what the organization knows about capability, does that information affect deployment or succession decisions? Leaders should be able to trace important evidence through the system and see where it changes another decision. If the information stops inside the process that produced it, the organization may have insight without system behavior.
3. Which talent decisions actually need to be connected, and which do not?
More integration is not automatically better. Organizations can create unnecessary complexity when they attempt to connect every process, dataset, governance forum, and technology platform. Executives should identify the points where one decision materially improves another and concentrate integration there. The question is not whether every talent process shares information. It is whether consequential decisions receive the evidence they need from the parts of the system best positioned to provide it. This is how integration becomes purposeful rather than administrative.
4. Can we trace a strategic requirement all the way through to coordinated talent action?
A talent system should make the path from strategy to action visible. If the business identifies a capability it will need, leaders should be able to see how that requirement changes workforce assumptions, role priorities, development choices, hiring decisions, mobility, succession, or other relevant mechanisms. If the organization cannot follow that chain, strategy may be entering the talent architecture without meaningfully changing it. The test is not whether strategy appears in talent presentations. It is whether strategic requirements alter real talent decisions.
5. Does the system learn from what happens after we act?
A mature talent system does not treat implementation as the end of the process. Hiring results, readiness changes, mobility patterns, development outcomes, performance evidence, and workforce signals should help the organization reassess the assumptions behind earlier decisions. If an external hiring strategy repeatedly fails, the system should reconsider whether the capability must be built internally or whether the role itself is poorly designed. If development investments do not improve readiness, leaders should question the experiences being provided rather than continuing the same intervention. A system becomes stronger when action generates new evidence and that evidence changes the next decision.
Taken together, these questions shift the executive conversation away from whether the organization possesses a complete portfolio of talent programs and toward whether those programs collectively produce coherent decisions. The central issue is not the number of practices, the sophistication of the technology, or even the quality of each individual process. It is whether the organization can connect strategic requirements, evidence, decisions, and action strongly enough to build the capabilities the business will need.
Talent programs matter. Succession planning, leadership development, performance management, workforce planning, recruiting, mobility, and employee listening each solve legitimate organizational problems. But their individual quality does not determine whether the organization has an effective talent system. That depends on what happens between them.
A functioning talent system converts strategic requirements into talent implications, uses evidence to inform consequential decisions, coordinates action across the practices that matter, and learns from the results. It does not require every process to be connected to every other process. It requires the right connections to exist where information from one part of the organization should materially change a decision somewhere else.
This distinction matters because organizations can become increasingly sophisticated at operating talent programs without becoming more capable of building the workforce their strategy requires. They can improve processes, implement better technology, expand analytics, and create stronger governance while the underlying decisions remain fragmented. Program maturity can therefore coexist with system weakness.
The executive challenge is not to accumulate more talent practices or pursue integration as an end in itself. It is to ensure that the organization can recognize what it will need, understand what it currently has, decide how the gap should be addressed, act through the appropriate mechanisms, and update those decisions as new evidence emerges.
That is the difference between managing a portfolio of talent programs and building an organizational capability for talent.
Talent programs create value through what they do. A talent system creates value through what those programs enable the organization to do together.
Supporting Research
- Collings, D. G., & Mellahi, K. (2009). Strategic talent management: A review and research agenda. Human Resource Management Review, 19(4), 304–313.
- Harsch, K., & Festing, M. (2020). Dynamic talent management capabilities and organizational agility: A qualitative exploration. Human Resource Management, 59(1), 43–61.
- Jooss, S., Collings, D. G., McMackin, J., & Dickmann, M. (2024). A skills-matching perspective on talent management: Developing strategic agility. Human Resource Management, 63(1), 141–157.
- Lewis, R. E., & Heckman, R. J. (2006). Talent management: A critical review. Human Resource Management Review, 16(2), 139–154.
